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In this paper I critically examine the most recent 
gauge-theoretic argument against the intrinsicality 
of fundamental properties formulated by French 
and McKenzie (2012). I show that it cannot achieve 
its intended goal (which is to undermine Lewis’s 
neo-Humean metaphysical project) but it can have 
a signifi cant infl uence to dispositional essentialists 
that hold that the fundamental physical properties 
are intrinsic features of their bearers.
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In the recent philosophical literature one 
can fi nd several arguments against the 
intrinsicality of (fundamental) properties 
as physical science describes them. Th ese 
arguments range from ‘global’ ones, 
concerning the totality of scientifi c 
properties as all physical theories present 
them, to more ‘local’ ones, concerning 
the fundamental properties as specifi c 
contemporary theories describe them.1 
In this short paper I concentrate on an 
argument of the second category. More 
precisely, I examine the most recent 
gauge-theoretic argument against the 
view that all fundamental properties 
are intrinsic which appears in Steven 
French and Kerry McKenzie (2012). Th e 
argument focuses on charges (especially 
the electric one) and its declared aim is 
to defeat Lewis’s Humean metaphysical 
project which is largely based on the 
assumption of the intrinsicality of all 
fundamental properties that serve as the 
minimal Humean supervenience base. As 
far as I can see, though, it is not just an 
1  According to one ‘global’ argument, properties of sci-
ence fail to be intrinsic because we only come to know or 
think about them via their causal/structural profi les (for a 
discussion, see, for instance, Jackson (1998, 23-24)). Th e 
most discussed ‘local’ argument is based on the phenom-
enon of quantum mechanical entanglement. See, for in-
stance, Ney (2010) for details and discussion.
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argument against Lewis’s metaphysical worldview but it has important implications 
in other areas of metaphysics. For instance, if it is sound, it undermines the almost 
unanimous view of dispositionalists that the fundamental dispositional properties 
such as mass, spin and charge are all intrinsic features of their bearers.2 It can also 
have a considerable impact on the ontic structuralistic project which inter alia aims 
to eliminate the intrinsic fundamental properties in favour of the relational (or 
structural) ones.
In what follows, I begin by presenting the premises of the gauge-theoretic argument 
explicitly.
Premise 1. Th e current best candidates for the fundamental laws of physics are 
formulated as local gauge theories.
Premise 2. According to local gauge theories, the equations governing particle 
interactions should be generated from the interaction-free equations by demanding 
that those equations are invariant under a local gauge transformation.
Premise 3.  In order to generate the properties of particles through which they 
undergo fundamental interactions (such as the colours of quarks and the charges of 
electrons) one must apply the appropriate gauge transformation to their interaction- 
free equation.     
Premise 4. Th e application of local gauge transformations implies the existence of 
gauge bosons.
Premise 5.  From premises 1 to 4, it looks as we have no choice but to say that the 
properties such as electric charge and colour are not the sort of properties that lone 
objects can have.
Premise 6.  If a property P is intrinsic, then whether or not an object is P should 
not depend on whether or not it is lonely (Langton and Lewis 1998). So for P to 
be intrinsic3 all the following four cases should be possible: a) Th ere exists a lonely 
P. b) Th ere exists a lonely non-P. c) Th ere exists an accompanied P. d) Th ere exists 
an accompanied non-P.
Conclusion.  From premise 5, we see that the fi rst of the four cases mentioned in 
premise 6 is not possible as far as the properties under consideration is concerned. 
Hence, at least some of the fundamental properties of the actual world are not 
intrinsic.
Th e point of the present paper is brief and concerns whether we have conclusive 
reasons to believe that premise 5 is unconditionally true. My answer is clearly no; 
but before showing that, I have some comments for the other premises of the 
argument.
2  Among the dispositionalists who explicitly endorse the intrinsicness thesis are Molnar (2003) and Bird (2007).
3  Actually, it is the basic intrinsic properties (upon which all other intrinsic properties supervene) that must satisfy 
these conditions. Yet, fundamental properties such as charge, if they are intrinsic, cannot but be basic intrinsic in Lewis 
and Langton’s sense.
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Premise 1, as it is here presented, is not indisputably true given that whether the 
General Th eory of Relativity (the best current theory describing gravitation) can 
be construed as a local gauge theory is a highly controversial issue. Nevertheless, I 
take it that what French and McKenzie mean is that the current best candidates for 
the laws of interactions related to the specifi c properties (electric charge, colour) are 
formulated as local gauge theories; and that is, to a certain extent, uncontroversial. 
Premise 2 is undeniably true because it only describes what a local gauge theory of 
interaction is.
Two points need to be said for premise 3; fi rst, French and McKenzie should have 
made clear the sense in which properties are generated by the application of a local 
gauge transformation to an interaction-free equation. Even under an ontological 
interpretation of local gauge symmetries4 (which is highly controversial and for most 
philosophers improbable) at least a brief story must be said about the metaphysics of 
this alleged ‘generation’. In absence of such a story, and for the sake of the argument, 
I shall regard this problematic claim as a kind of explanatory claim concerning the 
theoretical explanation of one of the roles that charges actually have and not as an 
ontological claim concerning the conditions of their existence. Th e second point 
concerns the kind of necessity that accompanies the word “must” appeared in the 
premise under consideration. As far as I can see, it cannot be metaphysical necessity, 
because French and McKenzie provide no extra argument to exclude the possibility 
of worlds that possess charges and, nevertheless, are not characterized by the local 
gauge symmetries that characterize the actual world. Th ere is no argument off ered 
even for the more moderate claim that in all metaphysically possible situations 
we are at least justifi ed to explain the interaction-role of charges by appeal to the 
demands of local gauge invariance. Hence, I construe the “must” under consideration 
as expressing a kind of ‘contingent necessitation’ related only to those worlds in 
which we are at least justifi ed to follow the gauge-theoretic explanatory route. But 
crucially this leaves room for possible worlds in which charges exist and either 
there is no theoretical explanation of their interaction-role or there is one which 
is, however, independent from gauge theoretic considerations. I shall return to that 
point soon when I shall examine the premise 5. 
In the spirit of the above remarks regarding the claims of premise 3, I also bypass 
the plausible question concerning whether there is an ontological sense in which 
the application of local gauge theories implies the existence of gauge bosons. So, 
sidestepping once again the ontological implications, I construe the claim of 
premise 4 as a kind of theoretical explanation of the (conditions of ) existence of 
gauge bosons.
Finally, and for the sake of the argument, I assume that Lewis and Langton’s 
defi nition presented in premise 6 is adequate in capturing the notion of intrinsicality 
at least for the case of the natural fundamental properties of our world.
4  According to the ontological interpretation, symmetries represent properties characterizing objects, or laws of 
nature or the structure of the physical world. Under the rival, epistemic, interpretation, symmetries are related either to 
conditions on the possibility of knowledge or to limits inherent in the human way of describing the physical world.
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Let me now come to the core of my objection to the gauge-theoretic argument. 
In premise 5, French and McKenzie claim that we have no choice but to say that 
charges are not the sort of properties that lone objects can have. Th is seems an almost 
unavoidable conclusion given the truth (under my charitable interpretations) of 
premises 1 to 4. But let us look more carefully on this issue. French and McKenzie 
think that they strongly support their conclusion because they are convinced that 
premises 1 to 4 prove that we have no option but to accept the necessary co-
existence of charges and gauge bosons.5 But is that latter claim true?  Recall that 
they refrain from providing any ontological explanations and, if I am right, confi ne 
their discussion to the most plausible contemporary theoretical explanations of the 
roles that charges (can) play. But what are those roles? Following their strategy, we 
seek them in what the contemporary physical theories suggest; and what we fi nd is 
that fundamental charges have a dual role. Th ey measure the strength with which a 
particle possessing them interacts with the appropriate fi elds and are fundamental 
conserved quantities. For instance, electric charge is the coupling measuring the 
strength with which a charged particle interacts with electromagnetic fi elds and is 
also a fundamental conserved quantity. Th e interesting point is that only the fi rst 
aspect of the role that charges play in the actual world is ‘necessarily’ related to the 
invariance under the action of local gauge symmetry transformations. Th e second 
aspect, the one concerning their conservation, can be captured by demanding 
invariance under the action of global gauge transformations which, crucially, does not 
imply the existence of gauge bosons.6
Let us now focus on electric charge and consider a charged particle in the actual 
world. Its total Lagrangian Ltot (describing, inter alia, particle’s interaction with the electromagnetic fi eld) is (partially)7 constructed by the demand of local U(1) 
invariance of the Lagrangian of the free from interactions particle. It can be shown 
that the application of Noether’s fi rst theorem to the global U(1) subgroup of the 
full (local) gauge group of Ltot yields the conserved current and, by the appropriate integration, the conserved charge.8 Assume now that the only essential feature of the 
property of electric charge is the invariance of the Lagrangian describing its bearer 
under global U(1) internal symmetry. In other words, assume that the conservation 
aspect related to the invariance under the global U(1) is what determines the 
transworld identity of electric charge. Under that assumption, the dynamical aspect 
(which concerns the interactions) is a contingent feature of charge. Hence, there are 
5  Necessary co-existence is enough for their purposes. I think that any claim about existential dependence between 
charges and bosons would be unwarranted given only the premises of their argument. 
6  Th e connection between conservation and invariance under the global symmetry is secured by Noether’s fi rst theo-
rem. Consider the Lagrangian density L of a physical system and the action S related to it. According to Noether’s fi rst 
theorem, if the action is invariant under a continuous group of transformations depending smoothly on independent 
constant parameters, then, given that the equations of motion of the system are satisfi ed, there are continuity equa-
tions for currents associated with each parameter on which the symmetry group depends. Given appropriate boundary 
conditions, each continuity equation corresponds to a conserved quantity. For the technical details, see, for instance, 
Ryder (1996, 90-92).
7  One of the terms of Ltot is introduced by hand. 
8  Conservation of charge can be construed as dependent upon the satisfaction of the equation for the matter fi elds in 
any possible world characterized either by global or by local U(1) invariance. But especially in worlds characterized by 
local U(1) invariance can be also construed as a consequence of a) the lack of independence of the matter and the gauge 
fi eld and b) the satisfaction of the fi eld equation of the gauge fi eld independently of whether the matter fi eld equations 
are satisfi ed. For details, see Brading (2002).
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possible worlds in which a free Lagrangian describes a charged particle. In those 
worlds charged particles do not interact and there is no law of their interaction. 
Some philosophers (most probably French and McKenzie included) may protest 
that there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which charges exist and do not 
interact. Even if the actual law of charge interaction (‘emerging’ from the local U(1) 
invariance of the Lagrangian) is a contingent feature of electric charge, there must 
(in the metaphysical sense) be some law of interaction in each world in which charges 
exist. I grant this to the protesters. But the assumed metaphysical contingency of the 
dynamical aspect of charge also implies that there are possible worlds in which the 
Lagrangian of a charged particle, though describes the interaction between charged 
particles, is one that it cannot be constructed through the demand of local U(1) 
invariance of the corresponding free Lagrangian. (Recall my comment on premise 3 
of the argument.) And one of these worlds is all that I need to ground the following 
objection to premise 5.
I invite the reader to consider one of the aforementioned worlds that contains a 
lone particle and is characterized9 by the global U(1) internal symmetry but not 
the local version of it. Th is world is metaphysically possible because, in absence 
of the local U(1) symmetry, we have no reason to assume that gauge bosons are 
present.10 Th e law of interaction of the lone particle of that impoverished world has 
(obviously) nothing to do with the local U(1) symmetry, whereas the particle itself is 
characterized by a property which can be identifi ed as a conserved quantity simply 
by demanding the invariance of its Lagrangian under the action of global U(1) 
symmetry. Granted that this property is the electric charge, I am entitled to conclude 
that the latter is the sort of property that lone particles can have. Th erefore, premise 
5 is not true and the gauge-theoretic argument is not sound. French and McKenzie 
do not have any claims for other natural fundamental properties besides charges 
(such as mass11 and spin) and so it seems that their attempt to undermine the view 
that all fundamental properties are intrinsic fails. 
Th is conclusion can be challenged in a number of ways. Yet, as I’ll try to show in the 
sequel, the most controversial assumption that supports it concerns the metaphysical 
contingency of the dynamical aspect of charge’s role. Indeed, in what follows, I’ll 
argue that the gauge-theoretic argument under scrutiny (given the presented 
charitable interpretations of its premises) can achieve its goal, but only provided 
that its defender rejects the above assumption.12 In other words, the gauge-theoretic 
argument against the intrinsicality of the fundamental properties is compelling only 
under the proviso that fundamental properties such as charge are characterized by 
9  A word of caution; my objection does not presuppose the ontological interpretation of U(1) symmetry and the 
reality of the gauge transformations related to it. We may easily rephrase the assumption of my argument saying that 
in the suggested world we have strong theoretical reasons to appeal to the global U(1) symmetry (but not to the local 
version of it) in order to provide adequate explanations of the behaviour of particles (recall my comments on premises 
3 and 4). I want to thank an anonymous referee for pressing me this important point. 
10  Soon I’ll examine other reasons that may challenge the metaphysical possibility of the suggested world.
11  But see Bauer’s (2011) argument for the extrinsicness of mass.
12  As we will see, by rejecting this assumption, the defender of the gauge-theoretic argument also rejects the claim that 
the property characterizing the lone particle in my suggested world is electric charge.
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essential interaction-nomic roles.13 
Let me start by examining a number of objections challenging the metaphysical 
possibility of the suggested world. According to a fi rst objection, there are conclusive 
reasons to deny in general the possibility of worlds where particles (charged or not) 
can exist unaccompanied. Some of the reasons are metaphysical (either ‘pure’ or 
scientifi cally-based), while others are related directly to the conclusions of the 
best current physical theories. As far as the former is concerned, I do not think 
that French and McKenzie want to appeal to ‘pure’ metaphysical reasons to reject 
the metaphysical possibility of the world of my scenario. After all, their argument 
aims to show that there is a scientifi cally-based reason to conclude that some 
fundamental properties are not intrinsic. Hence an appeal to ‘pure’ metaphysical 
reasons that have nothing to do with science would betray the spirit of the whole 
attempt. (Incidentally, in fn.13 of their paper, French and McKenzie believe that 
they present a ‘pure’ metaphysical reason to reject the possibility of lone-worlds. It is 
the case of an advocate of Armstrongian immanent realism of universals who thinks 
that fundamental charges are universals and so they cannot exist uninstantiated. Th e 
case against loneliness, however, presupposes multiple instantiation of universals and 
Armstrong’s theory does not demand that. For more ‘pure’ metaphysical reasons 
against lone-worlds, see Cameron 2008). Furthermore, the appeal to certain extra 
metaphysical theses, even if the latter are (in a broad sense) scientifi cally-based, 
would most probably reduce the power of the argument since it has to beg the 
question against the rival views. Consider, for instance, the possibility of appealing 
to substantivalism about spacetime as a necessary truth.  In that case every object 
that is not a region of spacetime is necessarily accompanied by some spacetime 
(ibid.). Th ough this reason is (in a broad sense) scientifi cally-based I do not think 
that French and McKenzie want to appeal to it. For, they most probably do not 
want to defend the conclusion of their argument in a way that begs the question 
against relationism about spacetime. 
Leaving behind all the metaphysical considerations, French and McKenzie seem to 
believe that there are conclusions of the best current theory describing some of the 
fundamental interactions (the Standard Model) that exclude the possibility of lonely 
worlds.14 Th ough I agree that the Standard Model is currently the best candidate 
for an adequate theory of fundamental laws of some of the interactions, I cannot 
see how its actual theoretical results can ground conclusions about the metaphysical 
impossibility of lonely worlds. Th is is not because I deny that contemporary science 
should inform metaphysics; it is rather because I believe that we should not in 
general confl ate nomic (im)possibility (based on actual laws and symmetries) with 
metaphysical (im)possibility. According to my view, scientifi c results should guide our 
search for (at least the fundamental) metaphysical truths as long as we acknowledge 
that the latter are metaphysically contingent. Acknowledging the metaphysical 
13  As we will see, this conclusion presupposes that the defender of the argument exercises a kind of scientifi cally-
informed metaphysics. But this is not an unreasonable assumption given the premises of the argument.  
14  Here are two examples from the list they present: there cannot be a lone-massive-particle world in the absence of 
Higgs fi eld and there cannot be a lone-charged-particle world in the absence of photons. As we have already seen, the 
latter scientifi c fact is the ground of French and McKenzie’s argument.  
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contingency of the fundamental truths that we reach in a scientifi cally-informed 
metaphysical context does not confi ne the metaphysical discussion to the actual 
world or to worlds sharing with the actual our laws and symmetries. For, there are 
possible worlds with diff erent from the actual laws and/or symmetries for which 
physical science can provide useful modal information (an example of those worlds 
is the one of my scenario)15. 
Th ere is plenty of room for disagreement about the above remarks concerning the 
relationships between science, metaphysics and modality. But fortunately we do not 
need to reach a consensus on these matters in order to show that the fi rst objection 
cannot support the gauge-theoretic argument. Th e reason is that following it renders 
the gauge-theoretic argument either unsound or redundant. Assuming that Lewis’s 
analysis of intrinsicality is true, the argument is redundant, because, according to 
the objection(s), no objects can exist unaccompanied, and a fortiori no charged 
objects can be lonely. So we do not need the argument to prove that charges cannot 
be intrinsic. If, on the other hand, we assume that Lewis’s account of intrinsicality is 
false, the argument is not sound, because in such a case premise 6 is false as well. 
A second possible objection challenges the metaphysical possibility of my suggested 
world by questioning the assumption that the invariance under global U(1) can be 
the only essential feature of electric charge. Given that that invariance is related to 
charge’s conservation which is one of the aspects of charge’s role, the challenge may 
appear in three versions. Either both aspects are essential, or the dynamical aspect 
is the only essential, or none of the aspects are essential. Th e fi rst two versions of 
the objection are related to the essentialist projects and will be examined soon. As 
far as I can see, the third version has a consequence that (most probably) French 
and McKenzie should be reluctant to accept. For, given that the above aspects are 
most probably the only relevant features that are based on current science, it implies 
that there are no scientifi cally-based features that determine charge’s transworld 
identity. So, following this version, French and McKenzie should accept that charge’s 
transworld identity is grounded on scientifi cally suspect (‘pure’ metaphysical) entities 
such as quiddities. Of course, as French and McKenzie themselves correctly point 
out, a scientifi cally-informed metaphysician (like them) may fi nd it extremely useful 
to appeal to extant ‘pure’ metaphysical views in order to develop her claims. But, as 
they also insist, the above metaphysician must hold that science circumscribes our 
conceptions of the metaphysical possible. And it is at least not clear whether a 
scientifi cally-grounded metaphysical possibility can ‘allow’ the possible existence of 
quiddities, especially in those cases (like the one under consideration) where other 
scientifi cally ‘decent’ entities can play the same metaphysical role. 
According to a third objection, my suggested world is metaphysically impossible 
because there is no possible world that is characterized by global U(1) invariance 
unaccompanied by its local version. In order to support a plausible objection, this 
15  Of course, if we assume that all the actual laws (and symmetries) are metaphysically necessary, the distinction 
between nomic and metaphysical possibility collapses. But this assumption needs extra arguments; it cannot be taken 
for granted.  
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claim cannot be a brute modal assumption. Yet, I cannot see what arguments can 
support it. Under an ontological interpretation of symmetries, the claim presupposes 
a highly speculative kind of metaphysical interdependence of global and local U(1) 
symmetries. And even refraining from ontological commitments, we are not entitled 
to say that in all metaphysically possible situations we have to theoretically explain 
charge’s role by appeal to both global and local gauge invariance.
I conclude by addressing a fi nal worry; is the property in the possible world of my 
scenario the electric charge, or a diff erent property (call it charge*) that happens to 
play one aspect of the role that actual charge plays? If it is the latter, my argument 
is not sound because the suggested possible world does not contain a lone particle 
possessing electric charge. Th e claim that the property under consideration is charge* 
(rather than charge) can be defended in two diff erent ways. According to the fi rst, 
the property of the lone particle is not charge because it does not play both aspects of 
charge’s actual roles. Whereas according to the second, it is not charge because it does 
not play the actual dynamical aspect. Both versions of the objection are related to the 
question concerning which features of electric charge are relevant to its transworld 
identity. As far as the fi rst version is concerned, my response is that the objector 
must give us a reason to believe that all actual features related to both aspects of the 
role of charge are relevant to its transworld identity. And the most plausible reason I 
can see is that they are essential features of charge. No property in any possible world 
can be charge (or counterpart of charge) unless it is conserved and characterized 
by the actual specifi c law of interaction. Similarly, and as far as the second version 
is concerned, the objector most plausibly must assume that the dynamical aspect of 
the role of charge is essential to it. Believing, however, that the law of interaction is 
an essential feature of electric charge is tantamount to believing that in any world 
in which charge exists the law holds. In other words, the law is metaphysically 
necessary. Hence the objector cannot make her case unless she begs the question 
against all those that hold that all fundamental laws of nature are metaphysically 
contingent (and of course Lewis is among them). I conclude that there is no cogent 
objection to the critic based on my suggested scenario which is consistent with 
Lewis’s nomic contingentism. Consequently, French and McKenzie’s argument has 
no force against its intended target. Yet, under the essentialist assumption about 
charge’s causal/nomic role, the gauge-theoretic argument succeeds in showing that 
charges are not intrinsic properties. Th is conclusion can have a considerable impact 
especially on dispositional essentialists who claim that properties such as electric 
charge are intrinsic and have dispositional essences related to their causal/nomic 
roles.16, 17 
16  Some global symmetries (such as the global SU(3)) have been construed as classifi catory of the elementary particles. 
An extra worry might be raised then that no possible world can instantiate them and fail to contain tokens of all the 
particle-types that fi ll the gaps in the relevant symmetry pattern. Th is is not the case, however, with global U(1) that 
holds in the possible world of my scenario.
17  Interestingly enough, French and McKenzie themselves contemplate the possibility of a contingent association of 
gauge bosons with charges. Th ey also point out that this possibility is related to a denial of nomic essentialism. Yet, sur-
prisingly, they do not think that denying this possibility begs the question against Lewis. Th ey rather insist that Lewis 
should provide an argument against nomic essentialism. Th ey also do not think that the conclusion of their argument, 
given the truth of nomic essentialism, creates a diffi  culty for some philosophers (dispositional essentialists) who endorse 
the latter view.
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